German researchers Benedikt Driessen and Ralf Hund of Ruhr University in the paper titled Don't Trust Satellite Phones claim they have found weaknesses in two commonly-used satellite encryption protocols that could render them vulnerable to eavesdropping in real time. They also describe how they reverse engineered the GMR-1 and GMR-2 encryption algorithms or stream ciphers used to secure voice traffic on a range of commercial satellite networks.
The pair attacked different digital signal processor (DSP) firmware updates for two handsets, Thuraya’s GMR-1-based SO-2510, and Inmarsat’s GMR-2 IsatPhonePro, extracting the encryption keys used to secure communications in half an hour using a $2,000 setup.
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This theoretical attack is mainly for commercial users who don’t employ extra security and ETSI, the standards body that looks after GMR-1 and 2.
Read the research paper's abstract from here:
Solutions : www.xcyss.in
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